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ABSTRACT
To promote research excellence, China’s government has been offering substantial financial
support for a small group of selected universities through three national research programs
(Project 211, Project 985, Double First Class). However, admission to these programs may not be
completely merit based. Based on a statistical analysis of Chinese universities’ scientific activities,
this paper shows that this institutionalized hierarchy is not supported by empirical data on research
performance, which contributes to inequalities and inefficiencies in Chinese higher education. To
build andmaintain research capacity, Chinamust support meritocracy across the research system.
1. INTRODUCTION
China’s research activities experienced rapid growth over the last 25 years, in parallel with the
significant development of its economy. In 2017, China surpassed the United States to become
the largest producer of scholarly papers (National Science Board, 2018). In addition to sizable
investments—China is now the world’s second largest R&D spender (Normile, 2018)—this
growth in scholarly production can be associated with the creation, since the 1990s, of three
national programs promoting university research (Project 211, Project 985, and Double First
Class). These programs provide substantial financial support to a small group of selected univer-
sities that now represent the bulk of the research output of the country (57.5% of China’s Web
of Science [WoS] publications [National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019]). However, these
programs have also been criticized for lacking transparency in how universities are chosen for
admission, as well as perpetuating inequalities in the Chinese higher education system (Qi, 2017).
This paper describes the development and stratification of China’s higher education system, with
an analysis of universities’ scientific output since the 1990s.
2. THE CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM
Research inChina is performed in an array of organizational settings: higher education institutions,
scientific institutes, hospitals, and industry. As is commonacrossmost countries (Larivière,Macaluso
et al., 2018), higher education contributes the largest share of China’s basic research production,
representing 83.5% of monographs and 75.5% of journal articles (National Bureau of Statistics of
China, 2019) including 85.1% of WoS publications. Scientific institutes (e.g., Chinese Academy of
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Science) contribute 9.4% of WoS publications (ISTIC, 2019) in China. There are many higher
educational institutions producing this work: China boasts 2,688 higher education institutions,
including 1,423 universities offering 4-year undergraduate programs and 1,388 colleges offering
3-year college diploma programs (Ministry of Education of China, 2019). Not all institutions,
however, are given the same amount of resources.
Institutionalized stratification of Chinese higher education started in 1954, when six Chinese uni-
versities were designated by the Communist Party as the first group of elite universities (“重点大学”
in Chinese). This group of elite universities increased to 16 in 1959, 64 in the 1960s, 88 in the 1970s,
and to 99 in the 1980s. One common characteristic of elite universities is that they are generally
administered by theMinistry of Education (MoE) or by the central government, while nonelite uni-
versities aremanaged by provincial or local governments. Elite universities have priority over non-
elite universities to admit students, while nonelite universities can only admit the remaining
students; they also benefit from preferential financial policies (Hu, 2011). Stratification of
Chinese higher education crystallized in 1995 with the creation of Project 211 by the MoE, with
the objective of creating 100world-class universities by the beginning of the 21st century (Ministry
of Education of China, 2000). The Chinese government offered preferential policies (such as the
priority to admit the best students) and financial support to universities whowere part of the group.
Between 1995 and 2008, the 112 universities admitted to Project 211 received 70% of national
research funding and 80% of doctoral students (Tang & Yang, 2008).
In 1998, Jiang Zemin, thenChairman of the People’s Republic of China, created Project 985 to
promote the development of a Chinese equivalent to the U.S. Ivy League (Jiang, 1998). The pro-
gram started with nine universities in 2009 and added another 30 universities in the 2 following
years. These 39 universities are all part of Project 211, but are providedwith additional resources.
In addition to Project 211 universities, a subset of universities owned by provincial governments
signed cooperation agreements and received support from both their province and ministries of
the central government; these are also recognized as elite universities. Prior to the launch of the
Double First Class program in 2017, therewere 141 elite universities (as shown in Figure 1) defined
Figure 1. Hierarchy of China’s higher education institutions.
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by the MOE as “universities admitted to Project 211 or co-operated by ministries and provinces”
(Ministry of Education of China, 1992–2017). These national programs are controlled by the MoE,
and while inclusion is purportedly based on the quality of research, teaching, and reputation, the
detailed methodology has never been revealed. Inclusion in those categories is also driven by geo-
politics, as the MoE required that each province had at least one university in Project 211.
TheDouble First Class program (“双一流” in Chinese) was initiated by the Chinese government
in 2017, aiming to build an excellent higher education system including both “First Class” univer-
sities and “First Class” disciplines, as both Project 985 and Project 211 officially concluded.
However, the concepts of Project 985 and Project 211 are still used, not only in academe but also
in industry, which uses graduation from Project 985 and Project 211 universities as a threshold in
hiring (Hartog, Sun, & Ding, 2010; Mok & Jiang, 2017). As the “Double First Class” program is
recent and our data ends in 2017, we do not focus on this new program but, rather, on those that
existed prior to 2017.
3. THE BENEFITS OF THE ELITE
Oneof the strongest benefits of being classed as anelite institution is the influx of funds providedby
the government. As Figure 2 shows, in 1991, research funding1 per capitawas, on average, $2,944
for elite universities and $1,026 for nonelite universities, with nonelite universities obtaining about
35%of the funding obtained by elite ones. Despite an increase in research funding over years, this
ratio remained unchanged in 2016, with research funding per capita at $160,745 for elite univer-
sities and $57,296 for nonelite universities (Ministry of Education of China, 1992–2017).
Admission to the elite brings immediate benefits to the university. For example, in 2008, the
last five universities were admitted to Project 211. As Table 1 shows, all five new elite universities
experienced a radical increase in terms of research funding received after their admission to
Project 211, ranging from 74.65% to 600.24%, which aremuch higher than the average increase
rates of all elite universities (69.59%) and all nonelite universities (54.21%) in the same period.
Such advantages are also observed in terms of external research funding from research coun-
cils. According to the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) (2008–2017), the average
acceptance rates of applications from elite universities ranged from 20.3–30.6%, while the aver-
age acceptance rates of nonelite university range from 12.5–17.5%. This gap in acceptance rates
haswidened over time, from 59% in 2008 (20.3% vs. 12.8%) to 82% in 2017 (27.9% vs. 15.3%).
However, the higher acceptance rate of applicants from elite universities does not convert into
higher completion rate. In China, all NSFC-funded projects are evaluated after the funded period,
and those that do not meet their objectives are graded as incomplete. While most projects are
considered as complete, 13.6% of research projects (27,041 of 171,372) funded by the NSFC
between 2003 and 2012 were considered as incomplete. The results show that researchers from
nonelite universities are more likely to complete the projects for which they were funded: While
only 8.3%of projects fromnonelite universities remained incomplete, this percentagewas 14.0%
for elite universities (NSFC, 2008–2017).
Elite universities also have advantages in terms of administration and international visibility:
They have independence over the promotion of their professors, while promotion at nonelite uni-
versities is made by the MoE. This leads to a gap in the proportion of tenured professors (i.e.,
1
“Research funding” is defined by the MOE as all investments received for research, which includes the fund-
ing from universities’ own budgets, funding agencies as well as special contributions from the government
and industry.
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associate and full professors): In 1991, the proportion of tenured professors in elite universities
was 50% higher than in nonelite universities (39.2% vs. 26.1%). This gap decreased to 42% in
2016 (63.0% vs. 44.5%). Professors from elite universities are also more likely to attend interna-
tional conferences, as they are provided with adequate funding to cover travel costs. While
77.1% of professors from elite universities attended at least one international conference in
2016, this percentage was only 16.1% for nonelite universities. Similarly, 15.4% of elite univer-
sity professors have visited a foreign institution as a visiting scholar, while only 5.9% of nonelite
university scholars had the same experience (Ministry of Education of China, 1992–2017).
4. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ELITE
The benefits provided to elite universities, however, do not translate into greater scientific pro-
duction and impact. While elite universities received, on average, 2.3 times more funding per
capita than their nonelite counterparts ($722,128 vs. $312,277 over the 2007–2016 period), their
Figure 2. Research funding per capita in China’s universities (1991–2016).
Table 1. “Welcome bonus” for entering the “elite club”
University
Research funding ($million)
2005–2007 2008–2010 Change (%)
Tibet University 5.13 35.89 600.24
Hainan University 8.050 22.29 176.87
Ningxia University 5.47 15.04 174.75
Shihezhi University 14.53 28.69 94.53
Qinghai University 16.24 28.36 74.65
All elite universities 14617.06 24788.98 69.59
All nonelite universities 6379.43 9837.91 54.21
Source: Ministry of Education of China (1992–2017).
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number of papers per capita was only 19.4% higher than nonelite counterparts (40.777 vs.
34.153) and researchers from nonelite universities published, on average, a higher mean number
of monographs per capita (0.583 vs. 0.364). This is also observed at the level of specific univer-
sities. Figure 3 presents, for both elite and nonelite universities, themonetary cost (research fund-
ing per paper) and the human capital cost (full-time equivalent per paper) of a single paper. Elite
universities (red nodes) need muchmore funding to produce a single paper comparing with non-
elite universities (blue nodes).
A further investigation was conducted regarding the research input and output of the subset
of Chinese universities that published at least 2,000 research articles and at least 700 interna-
tional papers indexed by WoS between 2007 and 2016 (N = 198 universities). This subgroup
of very productive institutions contains as many elite universities (97 universities) as nonelite
ones (101 universities). As shown in Table 2, while these 97 elite universities received, on
average, 1.9 times more funding per capita than their 101 nonelite counterparts ($942,463
vs. $506,754 over the 2007–2016 period), their research outcomes per $1 million spending
remain lower than nonelite counterparts. More specifically, elite universities publish fewer in-
ternational papers indexed by WoS (9.671 vs. 13.283), a lower number of local Chinese
Figure 3. Cost per paper among Chinese universities (2007–2016).















Elite (N = 97) $942,463 9.671 96.601 35.785 0.198
Nonelite (N = 101) $506,754 13.283 96.797 82.057 0.388
Source: Ministry of Education of China (1992–2017).
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papers (35.785 vs. 82.057), fewer monographs (0.198 vs. 0.388) (Ministry of Education of
China, 1992–2017; Qiu, Tang et al., 2008–2017), and receive nearly identical citations per
paper (96.601 vs. 96.797) (using citation data from WoS).
5. TOWARDS A ROBUST AND EQUITABLE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM
Since the 1950s, the Chinese government has maintained a clear stratification in the higher ed-
ucation system, inwhichmost of the resources are concentrated in the hands of a small number of
universities. This stratification has put elite universities in a privileged position, in which they
obtain the majority of government resources and their faculty have both better career advance-
ment opportunities andgreater access to the international community.Given this access to resources
and preferential policies, elite universities are more likely to attract and retain elite scholars and,
therefore, to preserve and accelerate advantages, leading to an institutionalized Matthew Effect
(Merton, 1968).
While previous studies attribute this Matthew Effect to the uneven distribution of scientific
resources (Yang, Gu et al., 2015) or the bureaucratic administration in science (Shi & Rao, 2010),
we argue that such cumulative advantages are rooted in the hierarchal structure of China’s higher
education system and its relationships with the political organization of the country. For example,
university administrative ranks correspond to that of the government and, therefore, each adminis-
trative staff level, from department chair to university president, has its counterpart in the govern-
ment. Therefore, the categorization of the universities has a strong effect on the political ties that
university administrations can have. For example, the president of Peking University (an elite
vice-ministerial rank university) is the counterpart of the vice-minister of the MoE, while the presi-
dent of Guangzhou University (a nonelite department rank university) is the counterpart of the
director of Guangdong Provincial Department of Education. Considering the hierarchical gov-
ernment administration in China (Cheng, 2017), universities with higher rank are more powerful
than their lower ranked counterparts when negotiating with the government for extra funding
and preferential policies, and lobbying science policies regarding national research projects.
Moreover, as elite universities are generally administered by the central government (while
nonelite universities are managed by local governments), the administrative ranks of their staff
are generally higher than their nonelite counterparts, which leads to a natural stratification in
China’s higher education system. Elite universities also have the advantage in their guanxi (one’s
close personal relationships) (Shi & Rao, 2010), having closer contacts with senior government
officials who design and implement science polices. Indeed, elite universities benefit from their
strong alumni network, as all 709 senior officials with ministerial rank and above in Chinese
government are alumni of elite universities (Xinhua News, 2017). With this strong alumni net-
work, elite universities can lobby the MoE or other ministries for preferential policies, helping
them keep their elite statuses at the expense of nonelite universities. This is why these national
research programswere criticized for lacking transparency and inequalities (Qi, 2017) as they are
tailormade for elite universities.
Despite these advantages, elite universities strongly underperform relative to other high pro-
ducing Chinese institutions. They publish on average, fewer articles—in both national and inter-
national venues—and fewermonographs. This suggests that the stratification of elite institutions is
not meritocratic, but highly dependent on factors such as guanxi, bureaucratic power (Shi & Rao,
2010), geopolitics, and administrative ranks. The classification, therefore, lacks distinction. If any-
thing, the elite classification is aspirational, rather than descriptive.
A new list of 42 “First Class” universities and 95 universities having “First Class” disciplines
were announced by the Double First Class program in 2017, forming a new group of 137 elite
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universities. All 39 universities included in Project 985 were admitted to the “First Class” univer-
sities and all Project 211 universities had “First Class” disciplines. It seems that the same story in
the admission of Project 985 and Project 211 happened again; universities are admitted not on
their research performance, but on their past classification. Although the detailed methodology
has not been revealed, some clues showed that some elite universities were allowed to designate
one discipline as the “First Class” discipline while other “First Class” disciplines were appraised
by the Double First Class Selection Committee, which confirms the privilege of elite universities
in China’s higher education system again.
In summary, institutionalized stratification exists in the Chinese higher education system on
which China’s national research programs are based. If China hopes for these classifications to
be meaningful, the admittance to the elite club should be both transparent and evidence based.
Without this rigor, the artificial classification of research institutions inChina is likely to continue to
lead to inefficiencies and suppress innovation in the Chinese higher education system.
Furthermore, although China used to have scarce resources devoted to science and therefore
had to be selective in funding (Jiang, 2000), the government now invests more than 2% of GDP
(World Bank, 2018). These resources should be spread meritocratically, so that China can realize
its full scientific potential.
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